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Abstract The revised International Health Regulations (2005) require that
countries develop plans for chemical threats. In 2012, the World Health Assembly
reported that most countries had not yet achieved ‘adequate capacity’. We review
the evolution of chemical hazards services in the United Kingdom, the result of 15
years of grass-roots pressure and an accumulating weight of chemical incidents that
eventually convinced the UK Department of Health of the need for a new national
public health function, culminating, in 2003, in the creation of the Chemical
Hazards Division of the new Health Protection Agency. Ten years later, public
health services are again being radically reorganized with the creation of Public
Health England, potentially destabilizing health protection arrangements and
creating confusion among roles in managing chemical emergencies. Incorporating
health protection into a broader public health organization, however, offers a new
opportunity to broaden the scope of health protection services to embrace preven-
tion of non-infectious environmental diseases.
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Introduction
In 1980, the World Health Organization (WHO), the International
Labor Organization, and the United Nations Environment Program set
up the International Program on Chemical Safety (IPCS) to advise
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governments on the scientific basis for chemical safety and to strengthen
national capabilities.1 Initially, the IPCS focused on safety of production,
storage, and transport of chemicals, but high-profile chemical disasters
with potential long-term impact on the wider public, such as the Seveso
disaster in Italy in 1976 (resulting in the highest known exposure to
2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) in residential popula-
tions),2 the Spanish toxic oil incident in 1981,3 and the Bhopal explosion
in 1984,4 led to a general recognition of the public health impact of
chemical events.5 In 1992, an IPCS expert panel found that countries
commonly lacked public health capacity, training, and plans with clear
lines of accountability. There was commonly confusion over roles of
emergency responders, police, local, regional, and national government,
and over the responsibilities of government departments for environ-
ment, health, and homeland security, as well as a lack of appreciation of
the psychological impact on the population and the effect of exposures
on vulnerable groups such as children, pregnant women, and the frail
elderly.6 Compounding these systemic weaknesses, the 1995 Tokyo
Sarin terrorist attack,7 and then the 9/11 2001 New York atrocity,8
raised international concern and exposed weaknesses in national cap-
ability to deal with chemical threats.9
The prospect of ‘white powder’ and ‘dirty bomb’ incidents that
might involve simultaneously infectious, chemical, and radiological
agents signalled the need for public health responses to be planned
around the management of complex situations in an integrated manner,
rather than organized vertically through the individual specialist dis-
ciplines of infectious disease control, toxicology, and radiological
protection.10 And this conclusion has been reinforced by the most
contemporary public health concerns about climate change and complex
emergencies.11
In May 2003, the 56th World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted a
resolution (WHA56.28) to revise the International Health Regulations
(IHR) to cover not just cholera, plague, and yellow fever, but also
biological, chemical, or radiological events of ‘international concern’.12
(A global surveillance study in 2002/3 identified 35 major chemical
incidents in 26 countries that met IHR criteria,13 and chemical incidents
have now been added to the responsibilities of the WHO’s Global
Outbreak and Response Network.) The IHR place new requirements
on countries to cooperate in any public health incident that has
serious international implications. The IPCS recommends that chemical
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hazards be dealt with within comprehensive public health systems that
embrace:
K incident planning and preparedness,
K training and simulation exercises,
K commissioning of emergency medical services to deal with chemical
casualities and decontamination,
K emergency medical toxicology and poisons information services,
K hazard analysis, risk assessment, risk communication,
K environmental public health tracking,
K environmental epidemiology, and
K environmental monitoring and modelling.14
At the 65thWHOGeneral Assembly in 2012,most countries admitted
to poor readiness for chemical threats, with average capacity scores of
only 45 per cent (comparedwith 70 per cent for food safety events).Many
countries requested a 2-year extension for establishing core capacities.15
Even when statutory duties and functional arrangements for chemical
safety, emergency response, and clinical toxicology16are well established,
there remain considerable gaps in public health capability to deal with
wider population health aspects. 17
As other countries work to develop health protection systems to
complywith IHR responsibilities, we offer an analysis of the evolution of
health protection services in the United Kingdom designed to deal with
chemical incidents.
Evolution of Public Health Chemical Events Services in the
United Kingdom
In 1974 in the United Kingdom, when general and clinical public health
services were split from non-medical environmental health services, they
were transferred from local government control to local NationalHealth
Service (NHS) authorities.18 The opportunity to set up a national public
health service as proposed by Galbraith in 197219was not taken. When,
in 1978, the government-funded Public Health Laboratory Service
established a national epidemiology unit20 following the review of an
outbreak of smallpox in London, chemical incidents were not perceived
as a significant threat and thus excluded from its remit. Through the
1980s, however, growing concern about chemical hazards led to a new
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focus onmedical management ofmass casualties and injuries frommajor
incidents.21,22 Then the clustering of leukaemia around the Sellafield
Nuclear plant led to a public enquiry and a recommendation for an
expert unit to support the NHS, but only in the interpretation of routine
statistics on clusters.23 In 1989, Scotland established a small environ-
mental public health unit with a broader remit24 and it quickly proved its
value in the management of the health risks of the Braer oil spill.25But in
England, the Government’s Department of Health was satisfied with the
status quo.26
Nevertheless, major drinking water contamination incidents (phenol
in 198427 and aluminum in 198828) exposed serious inadequacies in
public health capability. The ability of local public health services to
cope with chemical emergencies was widely questioned;29 there was no
provision for deploying back-up for local emergency services; ‘and no
central government responsibility for coordinating major chemical
incidents in peacetime’.30 Public health specialists remained almost
exclusively focused on communicable disease control;31 the Govern-
ment’s Health Department circular that set out public health responsi-
bilities of local NHS authorities did not even mention non-infectious
hazards.32 Two public enquiries into the Lowermoor aluminum incident
(where 20 tonnes of aluminium sulphatewere inadvertently emptied into
the water supply at the Lowermoor treatment works in north Cornwall
on 6 July 1988) pointed up inadequacies in understanding the longer-
term health consequences33,34 and recommended an expert panel to
advise local public health professionals. Although a ‘panel of volunteers’
was created, its advice could only have been accessed through the
Government’s Chief Medical Officers, and in fact it was never activated.
There was no capability to deploy teams of experts and no attempt to
address the shortfall in local expertise.29 Consequently, calls persisted
for a properly resourced national public health agency;35,36 government
advice still lacked clarity on roles and responsibilities37 and local plans
remained inadequate.38
In the absence of central government strategy, in the early 1990s, some
medical toxicology units attached to the National Poisons Information
Service (NPIS)39 and university academics undertook initiatives to fill
the gap. These so-called Regional Provider Units depended on generat-
ing income from contracts for 24/7 response to incidents, surveillance,
and research,40–42 but there was no common pattern of service provi-
sion, nor national evidence-based standards of practice. In some parts
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of the country, units competed for contracts; a local municipality might
contract with one unit and the local NHS authority covering the same
population contract with another.
In 1996, the UK Government Health Department, under increasing
grass-roots pressure,43–45 funded a very small unit, the ‘National Focus
for Chemical Hazards’, that operated from 1997 to 2003 to undertake
national surveillance, disseminate good practice and training, provide a
reference point in emergencies, and help coordinate health aspects of
emergency planning across government.46 This unit achieved its limited
objectives, but the National Focus had no authority to standardize and
coordinate the work of the regional provider units. The role of NHS
public health departments in chemical events remained confused,47 and
rapid access to authoritative expertise continued to be a problem.48
Though the various units undertook a growing number of public health
investigations of chemical incidents,49–55 capacity was limited and there
was no national field epidemiology resource.56
The Health Protection Agency
In 2001, because of increasing threats from deliberate release plus recent
experience with complex emergencies of flooding and of a foot and
mouth epidemic, the UK Government eventually accepted the need for a
national agency.56,57 The new Health Protection Agency (HPA), estab-
lished in 2003, created teams at area and regional levels supported by
national specialist centres, but it took several years to achieve reasonable
clarity about the relative responsibilities of the NHS and the HPA.58,59
Creation of the HPA’s Chemical Hazards and Poisons Division – by
incorporating the National Focus and the regional provider units –
allowed the HPA to reallocate relatively modest resources from infectious
disease services to double the chemical hazards budget within 12 months.
The Division introduced national standards and guidelines, training, and
research. It significantly increased the number of clinical toxicologists
available to the HPA through the NPIS. To exploit the potential synergies,
the HPA co-located the Chemical Hazards and Poisons Division with the
National Radiological Protection Board. Then, in 2005, it merged the two
organizations60 to create the HPA’s Centre for Radiation, Chemical and
Environmental Hazards. The service initially focused on acute incident
management, but piecemeal transfer to HPA from the Government’s
Health Department of central advisory functions (the consequence of
Public health services for chemical events
217r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0197-5897 Journal of Public Health Policy Vol. 34, 2, 213–225
growing confidence in the ability of the HPA and a Government political
imperative to cut the numbers of civil service staff in central London)
largely shaped its early development from 2004 to 2006. HPA’s Centre for
Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards absorbed transferred
functions including advice on the health effects of chemicals in air, soil,
water, and consumer products; the approvals process for pesticides,
biocides, and veterinary medicines; and the secretariat for the expert
advisory committees on toxicity, mutagenicity, and carcinogenicity of
chemicals; as well as the expert group on the medical management of
casualties from chemical terrorism.
Several major incidents, including the London bombings,61 the deli-
berate fatal polonium poisoning of a Russian in London,62 and an
influenza pandemic,63fully and successfully tested the HPA model of
national health protection services. But other incidents revealed persis-
tent weaknesses in managing chemical events. The massive explosion
and subsequent fire at a major oil depot in 2005 led to a huge plume of
smoke over London and the south east of England for 4 days. The HPA
provided advice on health risks nationally, but the incident exposed the
lack of national capability to sample the plume and make appropriate
public health risk assessments.64 The Government asked the armed
forces to assist. (Environmental sampling in emergencies is now clearly
the responsibility of the Government’s Environment Agency.) In 2007,
serious flooding in England provoked a public enquiry that revealed
general satisfaction with the overall civil response, but noted ‘there was
confusion over the respective roles and accountabilities in law of staff of
the Health Protection Agency, primary care trusts, strategic health
authoritiesy the Drinking Water Inspectorate and their interface with
Gold Command’.65 The public as well as the building industry found it
difficult to acquire consistent advice in the response and early recovery
phases, and ‘information was particularly lacking or inconsistent on the
sources of support available and possible longer-term health impacts’.65
Confusion persisted about the roles of national and local advisory
committees. In response, the HPA rapidly developed advisory fact sheets
for its website, but the structural issues related to coordination across
complex organizational arrangements remain.
One unintended consequence of including regional and university-
based provider units for chemical response within the new HPA in 2003
was a narrowing of their scope of activities. Previously, units were free to
use a broad definition of environmental public health and some were
Palmer and Coleman
218 r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0197-5897 Journal of Public Health Policy Vol. 34, 2, 213–225
working with local authorities on the built environment, housing and
health, and on burns, injuries, and violence prevention, in addition to
their core responsibilities for chemical events. From the outset, it was the
ambition of the HPA’s Chemical Hazards and Poisons Division to build
on this broader approach and develop services for environmentally
related diseases such as asthma, allergy, congenital anomalies, other
chronic diseases, as well as reproductive health. However, the Division
competed for diminishing resources with the much larger and longer
established infectious disease divisions. Government funders and the
HPA Board lacked enthusiasm. The HPA Board did commission a major
programme of work to measure disease burden in order to prioritize
investment,66but this ambition remained an aspiration. Had it followed
this line, development of services for environmentally induced morbid-
ities such as asthma and injuries would have featured much more
prominently, as would the HPA-led national Children’s Environmental
Health Strategy.67
In 2009, the newly elected UK Government announced plans for
reconfiguration of the NHS and public health services in England,
including abolition of the HPA as a separate legal entity and its incor-
poration in 2013 in a new broader public health national service for
England.68 (Devolution produced a variety of models for health services
and public health in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.)69 The plans
for England represent a radical step.70 The United Kingdom’s Faculty of
Public Health expressed serious concerns about destabilizing emergency
response arrangements and sought ‘clarification of roles and responsi-
bilities during public health emergencies’.71General public health respon-
sibilities would return to local governments from the NHS, with Public
Health England created as a new executive agency of the Government’s
Department of Health to coordinate nationally and provide some specia-
list services. The HPA, an independent agency set up by statute, will
disappear and its functions will be incorporated into Public Health
England, together with the current regional public health units of the
NHS, and the public health observatories and cancer registries. The major
concern of the public health profession about this change has been the
potential loss of independent advocacy and advice, a basic feature of
public health success over the last 150 years.71 There may be renewed
opportunities arising from the planned closer integration of health
protection services with general public health functions. This will align
health protection functions more closely to disease burden (for example,
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asthma, allergy, injury)66 and embrace the ambition of prevention of
chronic environmental diseases.67,72
Conclusions
Countries still inadequately prepared for the IHR should note that
chemical events can cause major loss of life, long-term disability,5and, in
major ways, disrupt psycho-social health and well-being of large
populations 73 as well as the economy.51 Countries should therefore
assess urgently their capabilities for dealing with chemical events against
IPCS guidelines.6
In the United Kingdom, major incidents exposed weaknesses in
handling public concern about longer-term health effects. A paucity of
data on health effects of environmental exposures prevented public health
authorities from being able to offer robust evidence-based reassurances,
thereby exacerbating media and public anxiety. The United Kingdomwas
slow to recognize the need for national health protection leadership,
unlike the United States which created the National Institute for Environ-
mental Health Sciences in 1969,74 the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s Center for Environmental Health in 1980,75 and the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry in 1983.76 In contrast, in the
United Kingdom, chemical hazards services evolved slowly through a
grass-roots movement pressuring an apparently reluctant government. As
with infectious disease control arrangements,31 major incidents helped
precipitate policy decisions.
Resources for the adequate management of the public health aspects
of chemical events are usually relatively modest, andmoreover, chemical
events are best addressed within a stable public health infrastructure that
can cope with complex situations. The HPA model of multidisciplinary
teams at area and regional levels supported by a national expert centre
has generally worked well in difficult circumstances (although this
model is now being reconfigured), and countries should consider moving
away from health protection models based on individual scientific and
professional disciplines to models based on amultidisciplinary approach
to complex situation management (‘white powder’ threats and out-
breaks of unknown etiology). Nevertheless, the scientific skills required
for the public health management of chemical events such as public
health toxicology, environmental public health, and environmental
epidemiology are in short supply, and governments need to work with
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international agencies and professional bodies to ensure sustainability of
national capacity.
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